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Introduction1
Arguments and observations that strong economy-wide transformations in economic 
organization are taking place have been steadily accumulating in sociology and 
business administration for about two decades or so, but economists have only 
relatively recentlyjoined the discussion (e.g., Siebert 1995).  While early discussions 
emphasized the increasing importance of various kinds of network governance, recent 
discussion appears to have predominantly cast the theme of transforming economic 
organization in the context of the emerging knowledge economy (e.g., Zucker 1991; 
Liebeskind et al., 1995; Grant 1996; Cowen and Parker 1997; Miles et al. 1997; Hodgson 
1998; Mendelsson and Pillai 1999).  Thus, firms are argued to adopt ”network 
organization” and engage in ”corporate disaggregation,” so as to become ”information 
age organizations” that may build the “dynamic capabilities” required for competing in 
an environment characterized by changes in the composition of inputs toward 
knowledge inputs, an increase of the “knowledge-content” in outputs, a stepping up of 
innovative activity, an increasing differentiation of demand, increasing globalization, 
and increasingly inexpensive networked computing ⎯ that is, the “knowledge 
economy” (Prusak 1998; Neef 1998).  Very strong claims with respect to economic 
organization are often made.  An overall theme is that firms need to become much 
more market-like in order to survive and prosper in the emerging knowledge economy.  
                                                          
1  This paper is my keynote speech to 63. Jahrestagung des Verbandes der Hochschullehrer für 
Betriebswirtschaft e.v., 5-8 Juni in Freiburg i. Br.  I am grateful for comments from the audience.  
More elaborate statements of the positions in this paper can be found in Foss (1999, 2001, 2002). 
A theoretical implication of this is that the traditional distinction between “firm”-
transactions and “market”-transactions is becoming increasingly irrelevant.   
 In keeping with the theme of this conference ⎯ “Die Evolution der 
Unternehmung in Wettbewerb” ⎯ I shall critically address these issues from a 
perspective that is strongly, if not exclusively, informed by Austrian economics (Hayek 
1948; Mises 1949; Kirzner 1997). An Austrian perspective is a particularly fitting 
starting point for such an exercise. Austrian economists have always been occupied 
with analyzing the discovery, dispersion and use of knowledge; indeed, to Austrians, 
all economies are, in a broad sense, “knowledge economies.” And many recent changes 
in economic organization may fruitfully may analyzed in an Austrian way as a matter 
of changing firm organization in response to a changed external environment in such a 
way that knowledge may better be grown, utilized and transferred.  As Hayek (1948: 
77-8) noted:  
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is 
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of 
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but 
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem 
of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources − if 
“given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the 
problem set by these “data”. … Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the 
utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. 
Clearly, this is a problem that is not only characteristic of “society”; it is also a very 
pressing one, and increasingly so, for modern firms.  However, Austrian insights into 
these issues need to be supplemented with insights from new institutional economics 
(Williamson 1996) and contract theory (Hart 1995) in order to provide a full picture.  In 
generic terms, I discuss the implications for the Coasian firm of the Hayekian notion 
that the dispersal of economically relevant knowledge is a strongly binding constraint 
on the use of planned coordination.  I take the increasing importance of such dispersed 
(or, if you like, “distributed”) knowledge in production to be an important 
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characteristic of the knowledge economy (Coombs and Metcalfe 2000; Foss 2001, 2002).  
Given this, I argue that contrary to many writers on economic organization in the 
knowledge economy, it does not follow that firms should emulate markets as far as 
possible in order to thrive ⎯ even in the presence of those radical knowledge 
conditions identified by these writers as well as Austrian economists.  
Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy 
A consensus seems to be emerging that tasks and activities in the knowledge economy 
need to be coordinated in a manner that is very different from the management of 
traditional manufacturing activities, with profound transforming implications for the 
authority relation and the internal organization and boundaries of firms.  There are 
several reasons for this.    
 Because of the increasing importance in knowledge-intensive industries of 
combining knowledge inputs, sourcing knowledge for this purpose, and keeping 
sourcing options open, knowledge-based networks increasingly become the relevant 
dimension for understanding the organization of economic activities.  Such networks 
typically cut across the legal boundaries of the firm.  Networks are particularly useful 
organizational arrangements for sourcing and transferring knowledge because of the 
comparatively higher costs of pricing knowledge in a market or transferring it in a 
hierarchy (Liebeskind et al. 1995: 7).  The increased reliance on knowledge networks 
tends to erode authority-based definitions of the boundaries of the firm, because 
authority increasingly shifts to expert individuals who control crucial information 
resources and may not be employees of the firm (e.g., Zucker 1991: 164).  Also, 
knowledge worker gain increased bargaining stemming from their control over critical 
knowledge assets.  Finally, the specialist nature of knowledge work (Hodgson 1998) 
implies that principals/employers become ignorant about (some of) the actions that are 
open to agents/employees, thus making the exercise of authority through direction 
increasingly inefficient.  
 The combined effect of the increased importance of knowledge assets that are 
controlled by knowledge workers themselves and of the increasingly specialist nature 
of knowledge work is to wreck the traditional economist’s criterion of what 
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distinguishes market transactions from hierarchical transactions. Thus, whether 
direction by means of order giving (Coase 1937) and backed up by the ownership of 
alienable assets (Hart 1995) obtains or not is increasingly irrelevant for understanding 
the organization of economic activities in a knowledge economy. Not only does the 
emerging knowledge economy profoundly change the authority relation, and the 
boundaries of firms; it also influences the design of firms’ internal organization, that is, 
their allocation of decision rights.  As Miles et al. (1997: 7) point out, a “…number of 
leading companies today are experimenting with a new way of organizing – the 
cellular form.  Cellular organizations are built on the principles of entrepreneurship, 
self-organization, and member ownership.  In the future, cellular organizations will be 
used in situations requiring continuous learning and innovation.” By suggesting that 
radical internal hybrids, “built on the principles of entrepreneurship, self-organization, 
and member ownership,” are emerging as stable organizational modes, this quotation 
(and others like it) suggests that mechanisms for coordinating economic activities are 
more combinable, and that the set of stable discrete governance structures is larger, 
than what is conventionally assumed in much of organization theory and in the 
economics of organization (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1996). These new governance 
structures are increasingly often referred to as “new organizational forms.” To the 
extent that new organizational forms represent new ways of combining mechanisms 
that have traditionally been seen as characteristic of governance structures that are 
polar opposites, they also exemplify the fading boundaries between markets and firms 
(Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000).  
Whither Economic Organization?  
It is no coincidence that so many of those who write on economic organization in the 
emerging knowledge economy approvingly cite Hayek’s work, particularly his 1945 
paper, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).  Hayekian 
(and Austrian) themes such as the coordination problem introduced by dispersed 
knowledge, competition as a discovery procedure, and entrepreneurship are very 
clearly mirrored in much recent work on economic organization in the knowledge 
economy.  The main difference relative to Hayek and the other Austrians is that recent 
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writers have taken these themes inside the firm, as it were (particularly Jensen and 
Meckling 1992; Cowen and Parker 1997).  They argue that detailed planning is as 
problematic inside firms as it is at the level of the economy at large.  In the process, 
they have come to the conclusion that knowledge economy firms are very different 
indeed from the kind of firms that are seen as typical of the industrial society (e.g., 
Miles et al. 1997).  They, too, need to foster an entrepreneurial discovery process 
comparable to that generated by the market (Kirzner 1997). In fact, knowledge 
economy firms are so market-like (because of their need to cope with dispersed 
knowledge) as to wreck havoc with the conventional distinction between firms and 
markets. At best, the difference is a matter of contractual details.  However, as I shall 
argue this does not necessarily follow, even if we assume “Austrian conditions,” that is, 
widespread ignorance in the face of dispersed knowledge (Hayek 1948; Kirzner 1997).   
Authority 
 One reason why authority is (allegedly) waning in importance is that it is 
becoming increasingly more difficult to monitor and direct workers, because of the 
specialist nature of knowledge work.  In terms of agency theory, what is being asserted 
is that the problem facing a principal is not just that he is uninformed about what state 
of nature has been revealed or of the realization of the agent’s effort (i.e., hidden 
information), as in the agency model (Holmström 1979), but that he may be ignorant 
about members of the set of possible actions open to the agent, or the agent may be 
better informed than the principal  with respect to how certain tasks should (optimally) 
be carried out, or both.  However, even in such a setting, it is possible to provide 
efficiency explanations of authority.   
 The Need for Urgent Coordination. Coordinated adaptation or action may be 
required when actions or activities are complementary (Milgrom and Roberts 1990), for 
example, when it is important to make some urgent choice (possibly highly inefficient), 
because doing nothing is worse.  In such cases, it may  be better to give somebody the 
authority to pick a strategy and make everybody play this strategy, if the inefficiencies 
from picking a bad strategy are smaller than the inefficiencies from delaying a 
coordinated solution 
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 Decisive Information.  Although the centralized decision-maker does not possess 
at least some local information, he may still hold the information that is decisive.  
Loosely, information is (strongly) decisive if ⎯ in a setting involving many cooperating 
individuals ⎯ a decision can reasonably be made on the basis of this information 
without involving other pieces of information (Casson 1994). Such decisiveness and the 
cost at which knowledge can be communicated helps to explain the allocation of 
decision rights (ibid.), including authority. If the knowledge possessed by, for example, 
middle-managers is not decisive, if the knowledge possessed by the CEO is decisive, 
and if it is costly to communicate the CEO’s knowledge, then overall decision rights 
should be concentrated in the hands of the CEO, that is, he should assume ultimate 
authority in the firm.    
 Economies of Scale in Decision-Making.  There may be economies of scale as well 
as learning economies in managing the internal relations between agents inside the 
firm and managing relations to outside agents (customers, suppliers, government 
agencies. Other agents may be happy to let a central agent incur the effort costs of 
negotiating, learning about potential suppliers, etc., and compensate him accordingly.    
 Defining Incentive Systems. Arguably, the emergence of the knowledge economy 
does pose special problems for the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive pay 
because knowledge problems are likely to go beyond the asymmetric paradigm (Foss 
1999).  It may be conjectured that the more we depart from simple settings where 
employees are very easily monitored, and the more complicated the control problem 
becomes, the more likely is it that the entrepreneur will choose to rely on multiple 
incentive instruments to influence employee behavior.  In a dynamic economy, 
maintaining coherence between such instruments is a recurrent task.  Economies of 
scale dictate that this activity be centralized.  Moreover, centralization is required to the 
extent that externalities arise when the instruments are controlled by separate firms 
and transaction costs hinder the internalization of these externalities. Both arguments 
point towards the centralization of decision rights, that is, towards authority. 
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Delegation 
 The reason that firms can thrive even though they (like whole economies) also 
confront the kind of problems relating to the efficient use of dispersed knowledge that 
Hayek (1948) identified is that they have recourse to delegation of decision rights 
(Mises 1949: 305; Jensen and Meckling 1992). However, in firms delegation is 
circumscribed in an attempt to cope with the control problem that follows from 
delegation.  An organizational equilibrium obtains where decision rights are delegated in 
such a way that the benefits of delegation in terms of better utilizing local knowledge 
are balanced against the costs of delegation in terms of agency losses. This provides a 
useful perspective on many of those new organizational forms that are argued to be 
characteristic of the knowledge economy (cf. Cowen and Parker 1997), such as team-
organization, “molecular forms”, and other manifestations of organizational delegation 
and decentralization: These are prompted by a market-driven pressure to delegate 
decision rights (e.g., to better serve customer preferences) and structure reward 
schemes in such a way that optimal tradeoffs are reached.  Thus, decision rights are 
delegated inside firms, but they are delegated as means to an end, their use is 
monitored (Jensen and Meckling 1992), and top-management reserves ultimate 
decision rights for itself (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).   
The Boundaries of Firms and Ownership 
 Some writers (e.g., Zucker 1991; Helper et al. 2000) argue that as knowledge assets 
become relatively more important in production, and as learning becomes increasingly 
important as a source of competitive advantage, the boundaries of firms will blur, at 
least to the extent that these are defined in terms of legally recognized ownership of the 
firm’s alienable assets.  The relevant loci for economic activities are networks ⎯ and the 
boundaries of the firm as being defined by ownership of assets are merely a distraction.  
However, it is easy to see that even in firms that have no physical assets, the 
boundaries of the firm may be crucially important.    
 Thus, assume a purely “knowledge-based” team, consisting of two agents and 
two strictly complementary knowledge assets.  The “entrepreneur” owns a knowledge 
asset that is “inside his head” (e.g., an entrepreneurial idea) and the “scientist” owns a 
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“patent.” It is prohibitively costly to communicate the knowledge embodied in the 
entrepreneurial idea.  Moreover, it is not possible to write a comprehensive contract, 
governing the use of the assets in all contingencies.  Given this, we may ask who 
should own the (alienable) patent. Now, if the entrepreneur makes an effort 
investment, that is, elaborates on his idea and creates extra value, the scientist can effect 
a hold-up on the entrepreneur, since the latter needs access to the patent to create value 
(and the contract is incomplete).  Of course, the reverse also holds.  One can show 
(details in Brynjolfsson 1994) that because of the externality problem that the hold-up 
threat creates, every agent invests too little; specifically, each party invests to the point 
where the marginal cost of effort investment equals ½ of the marginal value (because 
they are assumed to split the extra surplus 50 : 50).  Suppose now that the entrepreneur 
owns both the patent and the entrepreneurial idea.  This will strengthen the 
entrepreneur’s incentives (the scientist cannot hold him up anymore) and it will leave 
the scientist’s incentives unaffected. Rational agents will choose this arrangement. 
The conclusion is that it is possible to speak of the boundaries of the firm in terms 
of ownership ⎯ even in a situation where all relevant productive assets are knowledge 
assets.  Similar reasoning allows us to see why authority and ownership usually go 
together.  Assume that one of the agents, the entrepreneur, has decisive information (in 
the sense discussed earlier).  While it argued earlier that it would be rational to give 
this agent authority, should he also be an owner?  Consider a bigger  knowledge-based 
firm, with a group of n scientists (n >1) who each owns a patent. The entrepreneur 
aggregates information from the messages of the scientists and exercises authority by 
directing their efforts.  His knowledge is decisive in the sense that without it, all actions 
of the other agents produce zero value.  The entrepreneur  may improve on this 
decisive knowledge. Each agent needs access to his own patent and to the 
entrepreneur’s direction in order to be productive.  Given these assumptions, the hold-
up problem is still present: Any one of the scientists can hold up the entrepreneur on 
his investment, making the entrepreneur choose inefficient investments. However, if 
the entrepreneur is given ownership to the alienable assets, that is, the patents, the 
hold-up problem disappears. Rational agents will choose this arrangement. 
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The Combinability of Coordination Mechanisms 
 It is a prevalent theme in recent work on economic organization in the knowledge 
economy that coordination mechanisms (direction, routines, teams, prices, etc.) are 
basically combinable at will.  Notably, mechanisms characteristic of the market may be 
introduced into the internal organization of firms, for example, in order to foster 
entrepreneurship.  However, theoretical arguments suggest that emulating market 
organization inside firms, for example, by radically decentralizing the firm and 
allocating far-reaching decision rights to employees may be hard to accomplish in a 
successful manner. Unlike independent agents in markets, corporate employees never 
possess ultimate decision rights.  They are not full owners.  This means that those who 
possess ultimate decision rights can always overrule employees. Thus, there are 
incentive limits to the extent to which market mechanisms can be applied inside firms, 
and delegation, while not exactly a rare flower, is certainly a very delicate one 
(Williamson 1996; Baker et al. 1999).     
  Other means of introducing market mechanisms inside firms are also problematic, 
if for somewhat different reasons.  Thus, multi-task agency theory suggests that there 
are quite rational reasons for the “low-powered” incentives one typically observes 
inside firms (in contrast to the “high-powered” incentives of the marketplace) 
(Holmström and Milgrom 1994).  This is because managers wish employees to 
undertake multiple tasks, some of which may be very costly to observe and measure, 
but which may nevertheless be vital to the firm (e.g., sharing knowledge with 
colleagues, handling calling customers in a polite manner, etc.).   Providing incentives 
that are only tied to those tasks that can be measured (at low cost) risks twisting efforts 
away from the costly-to-measure tasks.  
 Taken together the reasoning above suggests that coordination mechanisms are 
not simply combinable in an arbitrary fashion.  Rather, they are complementary 
(another favorite Austrian theme). Ultimately, this is because authority and ownership 
will continue to be important in the knowledge economy, as argued earlier.  First, it has 
been argued that there is an inherent tension between ownership and delegated rights.  
Second, delegation is often necessary, but equally often needs to be backed up by a 
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strengthening of incentives because of the agency problem.  However, under multi-
tasking, there are limits to how much incentives can be strengthened.  Thus, rather than 
being combinable at will, coordination mechanisms, such as authority, delegation, 
pricing, etc., tend to cluster in predictable ways ⎯ reflecting underlying 
complementarities ⎯ in “governance structures” (Williamson 1996).   In particular, 
concentrated ownership, authority, circumscribed decision rights, and incentives that 
are less “powered” than those of the marketplace are all complementary elements of a 
system, namely, the Coasian firm, and they will continue to be so, even in the 
knowledge economy.   
Conclusions 
There can be little doubt that the collection of changes that we often refer to as the 
“knowledge economy” impact upon economic organization.  In particular, the strong 
increase in strategic alliances, the trend towards corporate (re-)focusing, the increasing 
number of spin-offs, and the many attempts to change internal organization towards 
more team-based organization arguably reflect attempts to better utilize knowledge 
and stimulate learning, while making use of the high-powered incentives of the 
market.  However, theoretical reasoning, drawn from both Austrian economics and 
organizational economics, does not support some of the more radical claims with 
respect to economic organization that are sometimes put forward.  In essence, it is often 
argued that what may be called the “Coasian firm,” characterized by authority, 
boundaries defined in terms of asset ownership and complementary coordination 
mechanisms will wither in the knowledge economy.  In contrast, theoretical reasoning 
suggests that even though specialist knowledge workers may become increasingly 
important in production and even though knowledge may become increasingly 
distributed, there is no reason to suppose that authority will wither, the boundaries of 
firms will blur and coordination mechanisms will be combinable at will.  Thus, 
although the Coasian firm will undergo changes, for the knowledge-related reasons 
identified by the Austrians, it will persist in its basic constitution. 
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